What does Abbas' Withdrawal from Presidential Race Mean?

7 November 2009
Mahmoud Abbas has often threatened to withdraw from the political arena but his announcement yesterday that he will not run for re-election as President of the PNA [Palestinian National Authority] seemed determined.

His decision is based on two main factors: one is the u-turn undergone by the US over Israeli settlements. Having announced that a freeze on settlement construction was a pre-requisite for a return to the negotiating table, the Obama administration is now apparently content with a half-hearted Israeli pledge to simply limit expansion in the occupied territories and Jerusalem. The second reason, and the straw that broke the came's back, was the statement made by Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ahmed Aboul Gheit, following a meeting with US Seceretary of State Hillary Clinton, in which he suggested that his country supported a return to the peace process despite the absence of an Israeli commitment to freeze settlement building.

It is clear that President Abbas feels abandoned by the US administration and betrayed by the Egyptian government. Hillary Clinton's response to his announcement that he would not run for President was dismissive and displayed little regret: she would continue to talk to Mahmoud Abbas, she said, ''whatever his title'. Some have interpreted Clinton's attitude as a message to Abbas that he will not get US support unless he can convince the PNA to change its policies in Israel's favor; if so, she is misguided because such pressure will not bear fruit.

Abbas' manoeuvres are further complicted by the fact that he is the first Palestinian leader to occupy the top position in four seperate Palestinian institutions - not even Yasser Arafat managed this.

Abbas's speech announcing his withdrawal was carefully considered, and laced with messages for various recipients. The passage regretting the failure to reach an agreement with Hamas came out of context and detracted from the seriousness and credibility of his decision, suggesting a lingering political agenda. He may yet hope to achieve reconciliation with Hamas and other resistance factions in the wake of his abandonment by the US.

So what now for Palestine? Several scenarios suggest themselves:
First: Postponement of the election of President and Legislative Council called by Abbas for 24 January. Given the uncertainty created by Abbas' withdrawal from the race, the failure of Fatah and Hamas to reach an agreement, and the absence of an obvious candidate to take over, this seems almost inevitable.

Second: Whilst it is clear that Israel, the United States and some Arab countries no longer support President Abbas and his authority, the Palestinian question and the peace process are no longer at the top of their agenda. They are currently more exercised by Iran's nuclear ambitions and how to deal with that.

Third: A new war in the region looks increasingly likely in the light of Israel's antagonism towards Syria, Iran and Hezbollah and its jingoistic attitude in general; Israel's recent interception of a ship carrying weapons from Iran to Syria, for example, and its alarmist talk about Hamas missiles with the range to reach Tel Aviv, Hezbollah stockpiling weapons and establishing sophisticated anti-aircraft missile launchers in southern Lebanon.

Meanwhile President Abbas faces several possible scenarios:
First: Notoriously stubborn, Abbas could continue in the Presidency and other roles, having postponed elections, in the hope that his withdrawal from the election process will force the hand of the US in regard to its bias towards Israel, perhaps requiring it to freeze settlements. This is unlikely to work, however, given that Hillary Clinton has already dropped this pre-requisite.

Second : The US exerts considerable influence over Abbas because it controls PNA funding. Currently the PNA has a $400 million deficit and is unable to fulfill its financial obligations and pay salaries. The US also controls the Dayton security forces. These are humiliating circumstances which weaken Abbas' position in the eyes of his party and the nation despite several demonstrations and rallies in support of him.

Third: He could respond to the voice of the Fatah conference which in August this year re-emphasized that armed resistance should not be relinquished. In this case we may witness an escalation of violence, civil disobedience and demonstrations, and perhaps a third intifada.

Fourth: The possibility for reconciliation with Hamas and other factions remains on the table but would require a radical change in Fatah's power structure and approach as well as a change in Hamas' attitude to President Abbas.

We hope that President Abbas will maintain his position which must be very costly for him on a personal level. The West, the US in particular, has invested billions of dollars in this leadership and the PNA and may not readily let him go.

Standing steadfast on his decision not to run for re-election might be the most important move in the history of Mr. Abbas's political career. As an older man he has certainly won the right to rest and relax, but the most important question is will he be allowed to do that?

The irony is that withdrawing from the election would mark the end of his political career with honor and delete some of his mistakes.